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Abstract
We establish a theoretical link between adversarial training and operator norm
regularization for deep neural networks. Specifically, we show that adversarial
training is a data-dependent generalization of spectral norm regularization. This
intriguing connection provides fundamental insights into the origin of adversarial
vulnerability and hints at novel ways to robustify and defend against adversarial
attacks. We provide extensive empirical evidence to support our theoretical results.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been used with great success for perceptual tasks such as image classifi-
cation [50, 29] or speech recognition [25]. While they are known to be robust to random noise, it
has been shown that the accuracy of deep nets can dramatically deteriorate in the face of so-called
adversarial examples [7, 52, 21], i.e. small perturbations of the input signal, often imperceptible to
humans, that are sufficient to induce large changes in the model output. This apparent vulnerability is
worrisome as deep nets start to proliferate in the real-world, including in safety-critical deployments.
Consequently, there has been a rapidly expanding literature exploring methods to find adversarial
perturbations [46, 41, 28, 37, 36, 31, 3], as well as to provide formal guarantees on the robustness
of a model against specific attacks [24, 26, 43, 54, 12]. The most direct strategy of robustification,
called adversarial training, aims to harden a machine learning model by immunizing it against
an adversary that maliciously corrupts each training example before passing it to the model [21,
28, 35, 34, 31]. A different strategy of defense is to detect whether the input has been disrupted
by detecting characteristic regularities either in the adversarial manipulations themselves or in the
network activations they induce [22, 18, 56, 32, 10, 45].
Despite practical advances in finding adversarial examples and defending against them, the definitive
theoretical reason for the vulnerability of neural networks remains unclear. Bubeck et al. [9] indentify
four mutually exclusive scenarios: (i) no robust model exists, cf. [15, 20], (ii) learning a robust model
requires too much training data, cf. [47], (iii) learning a robust model from limited training data is
possible but computationally intractable (the hypothesis favoured by Bubeck et al.), and (iv) we just
have not found the right training algorithm yet.
In other words, it is still an open question whether adversarial examples exist because of intrinsic
flaws of the model or learning objective or whether they are solely the consequence of computational
limitations or non-zero generalization error and high-dimensional statistics. In this work, we investi-
gate the origin of adversarial vulnerability in neural networks by focusing on the attack algorithms
used to find adversarial examples.
In particular, we make the following contributions:
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• We establish a theoretical link between adversarial training and operator norm regularization
for deep neural networks. Specifically, we show that adversarial training is a data-dependent
generalization of spectral norm regularization.
• We conduct extensive empirical evaluations showing that (i) adversarial perturbations align
with dominant singular vectors, (ii) adversarial training and data-dependent spectral norm
regularization dampen the singular values, and (iii) both training methods give rise to models
that are significantly more linear around data points than normally trained ones.
• Our results provide fundamental insights into the origin of adversarial vulnerability and hint
at novel ways to robustify and defend against adversarial attacks.
2 Related Work
As deep neural networks start to proliferate in the real-world, the requirement for trained models
to be robust to input perturbations becomes paramount. Prominent machine learning frameworks
dealing with such requirements are robust optimization [13, 55, 5] (including distributionally robust
optimization [38, 51, 19]) and adversarial training [21, 48, 28, 34, 31]. In these frameworks, machine
learning models are trained to minimize the worst-case loss against an adversary that can either
perturb the entire training set (in the case of robust optimization) or each training example individually
(in the case of adversarial training) subject to a proximity constraint.
A number of works have been suggesting to use regularization, often based on the input gradient, as a
means to improve model robustness against adversarial attacks [23, 30, 11, 44, 49]. Interestingly, for
certain problems and uncertainty sets, robust optimization is equivalent to regularization [13, 55, 5].
E.g. for linear regression and induced matrix norm balls, the adversary’s inner-maximization can
equivalently be written as an operator norm penalty [13, 5]. Similar results on the equivalence of
robustness and regularization have been obtained also for (kernelized) SVMs [55]. Cf. [6] for a kernel
perspective on robustness and regularization of deep nets.
More recently, training methods based on spectral norm [57, 33, 4, 14] and Lipschitz constant
regularization [11, 24, 54, 43] have been proposed, particularly as bounds on the spectral norm or
Lipschitz constant can easily be translated to bounds on the minimal perturbation required to fool
a machine learning model. Theoretical work connecting adversarial robustness with robustness to
random noise [16, 17] and decision boundary tilting [53] was also pursued.
Despite there being a well-established learning theory for standard non-robust classification, including
generalization bounds for neural networks, cf. for instance [8, 1], the theoretical understanding of the
robust learning problem is still very limited. Recent works starting to fill this gap include Lipschitz-
sensitive generalization bounds [39], spectrally-normalized margin bounds for neural networks [4],
as well as stronger generalization bounds for deep nets via compression [2].
3 Background
3.1 Robust Optimization and Regularization for Linear Regression
We begin by distilling the basic ideas on the relation between robust optimization and regularization
presented in [5]. Consider linear regression with additive perturbations4 of the data matrix X
min
w
max
4∈U
g (y − (X+4)w) , with loss g : Rn → R , (1)
where U denotes the uncertainty set. A general way to construct U is as a ball of bounded matrix
norm perturbations U = {4 : ‖4‖ ≤ λ}. Of particular interest are induced matrix norms
‖A‖g,h := max
w
{
g(Aw)
h(w)
}
, g : Rn → R, h : Rd → R , (2)
where g is a semi-norm and h is a norm. It is obvious that if g fulfills the triangle inequality then one
can upper bound Robust Optimization ≤ Regularization
g (y − (X+4)w) ≤ g(y −Xw) + g(4w) ≤ g(y −Xw) + λh(w) , ∀4 ∈ U , (3)
by using (a) the triangle inequality and (b) the definition of the matrix norm.
2
The question then is, under which circumstances both inequalities become equalities at the maximizing
4∗. It is straightforward to check [5, Theorem 1] that specifically we may choose the rank 1 matrix
4∗ = λ
g(r)
rv>, where r = y −Xw , v = arg max
v:h∗(v)=1
{
v>w
}
, (h∗ is the dual norm) . (4)
If g(r) = 0 then one can pick any u for which g(u) = 1 to form4 = λuv> (such a u has to exist
if g is not identically zero). This shows that, for robust linear regression with induced matrix norm
uncertainty sets, Robust Optimization = Regularization.
3.2 Global Spectral Norm Regularization
In this section we rederive spectral norm regularization à la Yoshida et al. [57], while also setting
up the notation for later. Let x and y denote input-label pairs generated from a data distribution P .
Let f : X ⊂ Rn → Rd denote the logits of a θ-parameterized piecewise linear classifier, i.e.
f(·) = WLφL−1(WL−1φL−2(. . . ) +bL−1) +bL, where φ` is the activation function, and W`, b`
denote the layer-wise weight matrix2 and bias vector, collectively denoted by θ. Let us furthermore
assume that each activation function is a ReLU (the argument can easily be generalized to other
piecewise linear activations). In this case, the activations φ` act as input-dependent diagonal matrices
Φ`x := diag(φ
`
x), where an element in the diagonal φ
`
x := 1(x˜
` ≥ 0) is one if the corresponding
pre-activation x˜` := W`φ`−1(·) + b` is positive and equal to zero otherwise.
Following Raghu et al. [42], we call φx := (φ1x, . . . , φ
L−1
x ) ∈ {0, 1}m the “activation pattern”,
where m is the number of neurons in the network. For any activation pattern φ ∈ {0, 1}m we can
define the preimage X(φ) := {x ∈ Rn : φx = φ}, inducing a partitioning of the input space via
Rn =
⋃
φX(φ). Note that some X(φ) = ∅, as not all combinations of activiations may be feasible.
See Figure 1 in [42] or Figure 3 in [40] for an illustration of ReLU tesselations of the input space.
We can linearize f within a neighborhood around x as follows
f(x+ ∆x) ' f(x) + Jf(x)∆x (with equality if x+ ∆x ∈ X(φx)) , (5)
where Jf(x) denotes the Jacobian of f at x
Jf(x) = W
L · ΦL−1x ·WL−1 · ΦL−2x · · · Φ1x ·W1 . (6)
We have the following bound for ||∆x||2 6= 0
||f(x+ ∆x)− f(x)||2
||∆x||2 '
||Jf(x)∆x||2
||∆x||2 ≤ σ(Jf(x)) := sup||∆x||2 6=0
||Jf(x)∆x||2
||∆x||2 , (7)
where σ(Jf(x)) is the spectral norm (largest singular value) of the linear operator Jf(x). From a
robustness perspective we want σ(Jf(x)) to be small in regions that are supported by the data.
Based on the decomposition in Equation 6 and the non-expansiveness of the activations, σ(Φ`x) ≤ 1
for every ` ∈ {1, ..., L−1}, Yoshida et al. [57] suggest to upper-bound the spectral norm of the
Jacobian by the product of the spectral norms of the individual weight matrices
σ(Jf(x)) ≤
L∏
`=1
σ(W`) , ∀x ∈ X . (8)
The layer-wise spectral norms σ` := σ(W`) can be computed iteratively using the power method3.
Starting with a random vector v0, the power method iteratively computes
u`k ← u˜`k/||u˜`k||2 , u˜`k ←W`v`k−1 , v`k ← v˜`k/||v˜`k||2 , v˜`k ← (W`)>u`k . (9)
The (final) singular value can be computed via σ`k = (u
`
k)
>W`v`k.
2Note that convolutional layers can be constructed as matrix multiplications by converting the convolution
operator into a Toeplitz matrix.
3
Yoshida et al. suggest to turn this upper-bound into a global (data-independent) regularizer by learning
the parameters θ via the following penalized empirical risk minimization
min θ → E(x,y)∼Pˆ [`(y, f(x))] +
λ
2
L∑
`=1
σ(W`)2 , (10)
where `(·, ·) denotes an arbitrary classification loss. Note, since the parameter gradient of σ(W`)2/2
is σ`u`(v`)>, with σ`, u` and v` being the dominant singular value and singular vectors of W`
(approximated via the power method), Yoshida et al.’s global spectral norm regularizer effectively
adds a term λσ`u`(v`)> for each layer ` ∈ {1, ..., L} to the parameter gradient of the loss function.
In terms of computational complexity, because the global regularizer decouples from the empirical
loss term, a single power method iteration per parameter update step usually suffices in practice [57].
3.3 Global vs. Local Regularizers
The advantage of global bounds is that they trivially generalize from the training to the test set.
The problem however is that they can be arbitrarily loose, e.g. penalizing the spectral norm over
irrelevant regions of the ambient space. To illustrate this, consider the ideal robust classifier that is
essentially piecewise constant on class-conditional regions, with sharp transitions between the classes.
The global spectral norm will be heavily influenced by the sharp transition zones, whereas a local
data-dependent bound can adapt to regions where the classifier is approximately constant [24]. In
other words, we would expect a global regularizer to have the largest effect in the empty parts of the
input space. On the contrary, a local regularizer has its main effect around the data manifold.
4 Adversarial Training Generalizes Spectral Norm Regularization
4.1 Data-dependent Spectral Norm Regularization
We now show how to directly regularize the data-dependent spectral norm of the Jacobian Jf(x).
Under the assumption that the dominant singular value is non-degenerate3, the problem of computing
the largest singular value and the corresponding left and right singular vectors can efficiently be
solved via the power method. Let v0 be a random vector or an approximation to the dominant right
singular vector of Jf(x). The power method iteratively computes
uk ← u˜k/||u˜k||2 , u˜k ← Jf(x)vk−1 = WL · ΦL−1x · · · Φ1x ·W1 vk−1 (forward pass)
vk ← v˜k/||v˜k||2 , v˜k ← J>f(x)uk = ∇x(f(x)>uk) (backward pass)
(11)
The (final) singular value can be computed via σk = u>k Jf(x)vk. Note, the right singular vector vk
gives the direction in input space that corresponds to the steepest ascent of f(x) along uk.
We can turn this into a regularizer by learning the parameters θ via the following Jacobian-based
spectral norm penalized empirical risk minimization
min θ → E(x,y)∼Pˆ
[
`(y, f(x)) + λ(u>Jf(x)v)2
]
, (12)
where u and v are the data-dependent singular vectors of Jf(x), computed via Equation 11.
By optimality / stationarity4 (u>Jf(x)v)2 = v>J>f(x)Jf(x)v and linearization Jf(x)v ' f(x +
v)− f(x), we can regularize learning also via the following sum-of-squares based spectral norm
regularizer
min θ → E(x,y)∼Pˆ
[
`(y, f(x)) + λ||f(x+ v)− f(x)||22
]
, (13)
where the data-dependent singular vector v of Jf(x) is computed via Equation 11.
Both variants can readily be implemented in modern deep learning frameworks. We found the
sum-of-squares based spectral norm regularizer to be more numerically stable than the Jacobian based
one, which is why we used this variant in our experiments. In terms of computational complexity, the
data-dependent regularizer is a constant (number of power method iterations) times more expensive
than the data-independent variant.
3For practical purposes, we can safely assume that the dominant singular value is non-degenerate (due to
numerical errors).
4u = Jf(x)v/||Jf(x)v||2
4
4.2 Power Method Formulation of Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [21, 28, 31] aims to improve the robustness of a machine learning model by
training it against an adversary that independently perturbs each training example subject to a
proximity constraint, e.g. in `p-norm,
min θ → E(x,y)∼Pˆ
[
`(y, f(x)) + λ max
x∗∈Bp (x)
`adv(y, f(x
∗))
]
. (14)
where `adv(·, ·) denotes the loss function used to find adversarial perturbations (does not need to be
the same as the classification loss `(·, ·)).
The adversarial example x∗ is typically computed iteratively, e.g. via `2-norm constrained projected
gradient ascent [31, 28] (the general `p-norm constrained case is similar)
xk+1 = ΠB2 (x)
(
xk + α
∇x`adv(y, f(xk))
||∇x`adv(y, f(xk))||2
)
, x0 ∼ U(B2 (x)) , (15)
where ΠB2 (x) is the projection operator into the norm ball B2 (x) := {x∗ : ||x∗ − x||2 ≤ }, α is
a small step-size and y is the true or predicted label. For targeted attacks the sign in front of α is
flipped, so as to descend the loss function into the direction of the target label.
By the chain-rule, the gradient-step can be expressed as a Jacobian vector product while the projection
into the `2-norm ball can be expressed as a normalization. Thus, `2-norm constrained projected
gradient ascent can equivalently be written as (the normalization of u˜k is optional)
uk ← u˜k/||u˜k||2 , u˜k ← ∇z`adv(y, z)|z=f(xk) (forward pass)
vk ← v˜k/||v˜k||2 , v˜k ← J>f(xk)uk = ∇x(f(xk)>uk) (backward pass) (16)
xk+1 ← x+ (x˜k+1 − x)/max(, ||x˜k+1 − x||2) , x˜k+1 ← xk + αvk ,
where the max(, ||x˜k+1 − x||2) ensures that if ||x˜k+1 − x||2 <  then xk+1 ← x˜k+1. Note, that
the logit-space gradient ∇z`adv(y, z)|z=f(xk) can be computed in a single forward pass, by directly
expressing it in terms of the arguments of the adversarial loss.
Comparing the update equations for projected gradient ascent based adversarial training with those
of data-dependent spectral norm regularization, we can see that adversarial training generalizes
spectral norm regularization in two ways: (i) via the choice of the adversarial loss function and (ii)
by iterating xk within the norm ball (whereas spectral norm regularization keeps the input x fixed).
Indeed, keeping the input x fixed during the attack and taking the sum-of-squares loss on the logits of
the classifier, i.e. `adv(t, z) = 12 ||t− z||22 with t = f(x) and z = f(x+ αvk), allows us to recover
data-dependent spectral norm regularization,
u˜k ← ∇z`adv(f(x), z)|z=f(x+αvk) = f(x+ αvk)− f(x) ' αJf(x)vk . (17)
Finally, note that the adversarial loss function `adv(·, ·) determines the logit-space direction uk of the
directional derivative in the power method formulation of adversarial training, as shown in Section 7.1
in the Appendix for an example using the softmax cross-entropy loss. The effect of iterating xk on
the range of regularization is investigated in detail in the Experiments Section 5.3.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Dataset, Architecture & Training Methods
We trained Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with seven hidden layers and batch normalization
on the CIFAR10 data set [27]. We use a 7-layer CNN as our default platform, since it has good
test set accuracy at acceptable computational requirements (we used an estimated 2.5k GPU hours
(Titan X) in total for all our experiments). We train each classifier with a number of different training
methods: (i) ‘Standard’: standard empirical risk minimization with a softmax cross-entropy loss, (ii)
‘Adversarial’: `2-norm constrained projected gradient ascent (PGA) based adversarial training with
a softmax cross-entropy loss, (iii) ‘Yoshida’: global spectral norm regularization à la Yoshida et al.
[57] in Equation 10, and (iv) ‘SNR’: data-dependent spectral norm regularization, as in Equation 13.
5
Table 1: CIFAR10 test set accuracies and hyper-parameters for the CNN7 and training methods we
considered. The regularization constants were chosen such that the models achieve roughly the same
test set accuracy on clean examples as the adversarially trained model does.
TRAINING METHOD ACCURACY HYPER-PARAMETERS
STANDARD TRAINING 93.5% —
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING 83.6%  = 1.75, α = 2/ITERS, ITERS = 10
GLOBAL SPECTRAL NORM REG. 80.4% λ = 3 · 10−4, ITERS=1
DATA-DEP. SPECTRAL NORM REG. 84.6% λ = 1 · 10−2,  = 1.75, ITERS = 10
As a default attack strategy we use an `2-norm constrained PGA white-box attack with 10 attack
iterations. The attack strength  used for training was chosen to be the smallest value such that
almost all adversarially perturbed inputs to the standard model are successfully misclassified, which
is  = 1.75 (indicated by a vertical dashed line in the Figures below). The regularization constants of
the other training methods were then chosen in such a way that they roughly achieve the same test
set accuracy on clean examples as the adversarially trained model does. Further details regarding
the experimental setup can be found in Section 7.3 in the Appendix. Table 1 summarizes the test set
accuracies and hyper-parameters for all the training methods we considered. Shaded areas in the
plots below denote standard errors with respect to the number of test set samples over which the
experiment was repeated.
5.2 Adversarial Training vs. Spectral Norm Regularization
Effect of training method on singular value spectrum. We compute the singular value spectrum
of the Jacobian Jf(x) for networks f trained with different training methods and evaluated at a
number of different test set examples (200 to be precise). Since we are interested in computing the
full singular value spectrum, and not just the dominant singular value and singular vectors as during
training, the power method would be too impractical to use, as it gives us access to only one (the
dominant) singular value-vector pair at a time. Instead, we first extract the Jacobian (which is per se
defined as a computational graph in modern deep learning frameworks) as an input-dim×output-dim
dimensional matrix and then use available matrix factorization routines to compute the full SVD of
the extracted matrix. For each training method, the procedure is repeated for 200 randomly chosen
clean and corresponding adversarially perturbed test set examples. Further details regarding the
Jacobian extraction can be found in Section 7.4 in the Appendix.
The results are shown in Figure 1 (left). We can see that, compared to the spectrum of the normally
trained and global spectral norm regularized model, the spectrum of adversarially trained and data-
dependent spectral norm regularized models is significantly damped after training. In fact, the
data-dependent spectral norm regularizer seems to dampen the singular values even slightly more
effectively than adversarial training, while global spectral norm regularization has almost no effect
compared to standard training.
Alignment of adversarial perturbations with singular vectors. We compute the cosine-similarity
of adversarial perturbations with singular vectors vr of the Jacobian Jf(x), extracted at a number of
test set examples, as a function of the rank of the singular vectors returned by the SVD decomposition.
For comparison we also show the cosine-similarity with the singular vectors of a random network as
well as the cosine-similarity with random perturbations.
The results are shown in Figure 1 (right). We can see that for all training methods (except the random
network) adversarial perturbations are strongly aligned with the dominant singular vectors while
the alignment decreases towards the bottom-ranked singular vectors. For the random network, the
alignment is roughly constant with respect to rank. Interestingly, this strong alignment with dominant
singular vectors also explains why input gradient regularization and fast gradient method (FGM)
based adversarial training do not sufficiently protect against adversarial attacks, namely because the
input gradient, resp. a single power method iteration, do not yield a sufficiently good approximation
for the dominant singular vector in general.
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Figure 1: (Left) Singular value spectrum of the Jacobian Jf(x) for networks f trained with different
training methods. (Right) Cosine-similarity of adversarial perturbations with singular vectors vr of
the Jacobian Jf(x), as a function of the rank r of the singular vector. For comparison we also show
the cosine-similarity with the singular vectors of a random network as well as the alignment with
random perturbations. Curves were aggregated over 200 samples from the test set.
Adversarial classification accuracy. A plot of the classification accuracy on adversarially perturbed
test examples, as a function of the perturbation strength , can be found in Figure 3 (left). We
can see that the adversarial accuracy of the data-dependent spectral norm regularized model lies
between that for the normal and adversarially trained model, while global spectral norm regularization
does not seem to robustify the model against adversarial attacks. I.e. data-dependent spectral norm
regularization can already account for a considerable amount of robustness against adversarial
examples. This is in line with our earlier observation that adversarial perturbations tend to align with
dominant singular vectors and supports our theoretical result that adversarial training generalizes
spectral norm regularization. We speculate that the remaining gap between adversarially trained
models and data-dependent spectral norm regularized ones might to some extent be attributable to the
fact that we used `2-norm constrained attacks for evaluation and adversarial training, allowing the
adversarial model to profit from potential overfitting to the specific attack.
5.3 Local Linearity & Range of Regularization Effects
Local linearity. In order to determine the size of the area where a locally linear approximation is
valid, we measure the deviation from linearity of φL−1(x+ z) as the distance ||z||2 to x is increased
in random and adversarial directions, i.e. we measure ||φL−1(x+ z)− (φL−1(x) + JφL−1(x)z)||2
as a function of the distance ||z||2, for random and adversarial perturbations z, aggregated over 200
data points x in the test set, with adversarial perturbations serving as a proxy for the direction in
which the linear approximation holds the least. The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how
good the linear approximation for different training methods is, as an increasing number of activation
boundaries are crossed with increasing perturbation radius. See Figure 1 in [42] or Figure 3 in [40]
for an illustration of activation boundary tesselations in the input space.
The results are shown in Figure 2 (left). We can see that adversarial training and data-dependent
spectral norm regularization give rise to models that are considerably more linear than the clean
trained one, both in random as well as adversarial directions. Compared to the normally trained
model, the adversarially trained and spectral norm regularized ones remain flat in random directions
for pertubations of considerable magnitude and even remain flat in the adversarial direction for
perturbation magnitudes up to the order of the  used during adversarial training, while the deviation
from linearity seems to increase roughly linearly with ||z||2 thereafter. The global spectral norm
regularized model behaves similar to the normally trained one (curve omitted).
Largest singular value over distance. Figure 2 (right) shows the largest singular value of the
linear operator Jf(x+z) as the distance ||z||2 from x is increased, both along random and adversarial
directions, for different training methods. We can see that the naturally trained network develops
large dominant singular values around the data point during training, while the adversarially trained
and data-dependent spectral norm regularized models manage to keep the dominant singular value
low in the vicinity of x.
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of the distance ||z||2 from x for random and adversarial perturbations z. (Right) Largest singular
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Alignment of adversarial perturbations with dominant singular vector as a function of . Fig-
ure 3 (right) shows the cosine-similarity of adversarial perturbations of mangitude  with the dominant
singular vector of Jf(x), as a function of perturbation magnitude . For comparison, we also include
the alignment with random perturbations. For all training methods, the larger the perturbation mag-
nitude , the lesser the adversarial perturbation aligns with the dominant singular vector of Jf(x),
which is to be expected for a simultaneously increasing deviation from linearity. The alignment is
similar for adversarially trained and data-dependent spectral norm regularized models and for both
larger than that of global spectral norm regularized and naturally trained models.
6 Conclusion
We established a theoretical link between adversarial training and operator norm regularization
for deep neural networks. Specifically, we showed that adversarial training is a data-dependent
generalization of spectral norm regularization. We conducted extensive empirical evaluations showing
that (i) adversarial perturbations align with dominant singular vectors, (ii) adversarial training and
data-dependent spectral norm regularization dampen the singular values, and (iii) both training
methods give rise to models that are significantly more linear around data points than normally trained
ones. Our results provide fundamental insights into the origin of adversarial vulnerability and hint at
novel ways to robustify and defend against adversarial attacks.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Effect of the Adversarial Loss Function on the Logit-space Direction
The adversarial loss function determines the logit-space direction uk of the directional derivative in
the power method like formulation of adversarial training in Equation 16.
Let us consider this for the softmax cross-entropy loss, defined as
`adv(y, z) = − log(sy(z)) = −zy + log
(
d∑
k=1
exp(zk)
)
, sy(z) :=
exp(zy)∑d
k=1 exp(zk)
(18)
Untargeted `2-PGA on softmax cross-entropy loss: (forward pass)[
u˜k ← ∇z`adv(y, z)|z=f(xk)
]
i
= si(f(xk))− δiy (19)
Targeted `2-PGA on softmax cross-entropy loss: (forward pass)[
u˜k ← −∇z`adv(yadv, z)|z=f(xk)
]
i
= δiyadv − si(f(xk)) (20)
Notice that the logit gradient can be computed in a forward pass by analytically expressing it in terms
of the arguments of the objective function (this is why we call the uk update a forward pass).
Interestingly, for a temperature-dependent softmax cross-entropy loss, the logit-space direction
becomes a “label-flip” vector in the low-temperature limit (high inverse temperature β → ∞)
where the softmax converges to the argmax: sβ(z)
β→∞−→ arg max(z). E.g. for targeted attacks[
uβ→∞k
]
i
= δiyadv − δiy(xk). This implies that iterative PGA finds an input space perturbation vk
that corresponds to the steepest ascent of f along the “label flip” direction uβ→∞k . See Appendix 7.2
for further details.
A note on canonical link functions. Interestingly, the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the log-odds of the
classifier takes the form “prediction - target” for both the sum-of-squares error as well as the softmax
cross-entropy loss. This is in fact a general result of modelling the target variable with a conditional
distribution from the exponential family along with a canonical link (activation) function. For our
purposes, this means that in both cases adversarial attacks try to find perturbations in input space that
induce a logit perturbation that is the difference between the current prediction (log-odds) and the
attack target (cf. note on “directional derivative” interpretation of the power method).
7.2 Temperature-dependent Softmax Cross-entropy based PGA Attack
The temperature-dependent softmax cross-entropy loss is defined as
`adv(y, z) = − log(sβy (z)) = −βzy + log
(
d∑
k=1
exp(βzk)
)
, sβy (z) :=
exp(βzy)∑d
k=1 exp(βzk)
(21)
where β = T−1 denotes the inverse temperature. As β → ∞ (T → 0) the softmax converges
pointwise to the argmax: sβ(z)
β→∞−→ arg max(z).
Untargeted `2-PGA on softmax cross-entropy loss: (forward pass)[
u˜k ← ∇z`adv(y, z)|z=f(xk)
]
i
= β(sβi (f(xk))− δiy) (22)
Targeted `2-PGA on softmax cross-entropy loss: (forward pass)[
u˜k ← −∇z`adv(yadv, z)|z=f(xk)
]
i
= β(δiyadv − sβi (f(xk))) (23)
Note, we can drop the pre-factor β in the update equations for u˜k as it gets cancelled anyway when
normalizing.
The interesting point is that in the low-temperature limit, the logit-space direction uβ→∞k becomes a
“label-flip” vector. E.g. for targeted attacks,[
uβ→∞k
]
i
= δiyadv − δiy(xk) (24)
where y(xk) denotes the argmax of the current prediction (and we neglected the pre-factor β).
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7.3 Dataset, Architecture & Training Methods
We trained Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) with seven hidden layers and batch normalization
on the CIFAR10 data set [27]. The CIFAR10 dataset consists of 60k 32 × 32 colour images in
10 classes, with 6k images per class. It comes in a pre-packaged train-test split, with 50k training
images and 10k test images, and can readily be downloaded from https://www.cs.toronto.edu/
~kriz/cifar.html.
We conduct our experiments on a pre-trained standard convolutional neural network, employing
7 convolutional layers, augmented with BatchNorm, ReLU nonlinearities and MaxPooling. The
network achieves 93.5% accuracy on a clean test set. Relevant links to download the pre-trained
model can be found in our codebase.
We adopt the following standard preprocessing and data augmentation scheme: Each training image
is zero-padded with four pixels on each side, randomly cropped to produce a new image with the
original dimensions and horizontally flipped with probability one half. We also standardize each
image to have zero mean and unit variance when passing it to the classifier.
The attack strength  used for PGA was chosen to be the smallest value such that almost all adver-
sarially perturbed inputs to the standard model are successfully misclassified, which is  = 1.75.
The regularization constants of the other training methods were then chosen in such a way that they
roughly achieve the same test set accuracy on clean examples as the adversarially trained model does,
i.e. we allow a comparable drop in clean accuracy for regularized and adversarially trained models.
When training the derived regularized models, we started from a pre-trained checkpoint and ran a
hyper-parameter search over number of epochs, learning rate and regularization constants. Table 1
summarizes the test set accuracies and hyper-parameters for all the training methods we considered.
7.4 Extracting Jacobian as a Matrix
Since we know that any neural network with its nonlinear activation function set to fixed values
represents a linear operator, which, locally, is a good approximation to the neural network itself,
we develop a method to fully extract and specify this linear operator in the neighborhood of any
input datapoint x. We have found the naive way of determining each entry of the linear operator by
consecutively computing changes to individual basis vectors to be numerically unstable and therefore
have settled for a more robust alternative:
In a first step, we run a set of randomly perturbed versions of x through the network (with fixed
activation functions) and record their outputs at the particular layer that is of interest to us (usually the
logit layer). In a second step, we compute a linear regression on these input-output pairs to obtain a
weight matrix W as well as a bias vector b, thereby fully specifying the linear operator. The singular
vectors and values of W can be obtained by performing an SVD.
13
